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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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In-Service Support of Surface Navy Combat Systems: Safety, 
Effectiveness, and Affordability Reviews: The Systems 
Engineering Process at NSWC PHD 
Stephen Meade—CDR Meade was born and raised in Upper Marlboro, Maryland.  He graduated 
from North Carolina State University in 1993 with a Bachelors of Science in Materials Science and 
Engineering and was commissioned in the U.S. Navy through the ROTC program.  CDR Meade 
received his Masters of Science in Applied Physics with a focus on Electromagnetic Sensors from the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  CDR Meade is currently assigned as the Air Dominance Department 
Officer at NSWC Port Hueneme Division.  He has completed a dual degree program for a MBA and 
MS in Program Management from the University of Maryland, University College.  He has also 







Many DoD Field Activities have been designated as In-Service Engineering Agents 
(ISEAs) for individual warfighting systems.  As ISEA, it is crucial to periodically 
assess system capabilities and limitations individually, as a class, and as a strike 
force, as well as the technical community’s ability to support the systems in question.  
Issues resulting from these assessments must be brought forward and addressed in 
an appropriate manner.  From an acquisition perspective, limitations that require 
materiel solutions must be fed through the Navy’s budgeting process so that focused 
and coordinated engineering efforts can be undertaken.  These issues must be 
provided across the acquisition and technical community, including the industrial 
base, so that they can influence change in the design of systems.  
An example of this ISEA assessment is the Naval Surface Warfare Center Port 
Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) Safety, Effectiveness, and Affordability Review 
(SEAR) process.  NSWC PHD conducts In-Service Engineering (ISE) which 
demands the rigorous and continual application of well-structured, systematic 
processes that, at their core, are integrated as a Systems Engineering approach. 
According to the Acquisition and Capabilities Guidebook, a Systems Engineering 
Plan (SEP) is a mandatory milestone document that is required at milestones A, B, 
and C and also program initiation for ships” (SECNAV, 2008). One of the biggest 
challenges to the SEP is how to maintain the discipline for not only the Milestones, 
but also over the systems Lifecycle, and to maintain the Safety, Effectiveness and 
Affordability of each system. This requires continuous vigilance, starting with subject 
matter experts looking at the reams of data that support the condition of the systems, 
boiling it down to systemic trends that have adverse effect on the mission, and finally 
developing solutions that not only fix the issues, but are affordable over the lifecycle 
and can be fed back into the design. This continuous loop of disciplined systems 
engineering rigor is the cornerstone of maximizing mission performance capability.  
This information must be utilized by the acquisition and technical communities to 
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improve the design and capabilities of our systems.  This effort includes training, 
logistics, and maintenance.  Maintenance and upgrade of these programs is critical 
to keeping warships relevant, reducing obsolescence, and increasing commonality.  
This will also improve fleet readiness and fleet interoperability. 
This paper will focus on the process of periodic Safety, Effectiveness, and 
Affordability reviews at the equipment, system, platform, and battle group levels to 
identify drivers that reduce readiness and/or interoperability in the current fleet and 
push recommended fix plans into the Navy acquisition process for program updates.  
It also will allow the acquisition and operational communities to make more effective 
and efficient decisions on funding affecting the Navy’s budgetary cycles.  SEAR data 
provides a critical quantifiable perspective to decision makers to make better 
acquisition decisions.  This information must be shared with industry as well, so that 
they can incorporate it into their planning, development, engineering, manufacturing, 
and production.  This facilitates development and promulgation of significant lessons 
learned across the government and industry team, and initiates the appropriate 
changes to technical procedures, requirements, standards, and policies. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to outline why the Safety, Effectiveness, and 
Affordability Review (SEAR) process is foundational and necessary for the Naval Surface 
Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) to effectively execute its role as an 
In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) and to give a brief overview of the process and its core 
elements.  It will also show how this process needs to be expanded and shared across the 
other engineering agents, acquisition community, and industry. 
Background 
The In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) has always been focused on the functions 
of maintaining Combat System Safety and Effectiveness.  In today’s environment of budget 
constraints, rapid introduction of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment, and 
associated obsolescence issues, Affordability is also a critical focus area.  Not only is a 
system level review of these areas beneficial, but the operational concerns with 
interoperability necessitates a platform level review.  
NSWC PHD has been conducting Safety, Effectiveness, and Affordability Reviews 
(SEAR) of the Combat System Elements for which they are responsible as ISEA.  They 
have also been conducting platform level SEARs with all of the systems under their 
cognizance.  The SEAR process is aligned with the tasking from Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) and the Program Executive Offices (PEOs).  This includes providing 
the technical insight and compliance with requirements, standards, and policies with 
recommendations on significant technical issues.  NSWC PHD is also tasked with facilitating 
the development and promulgation of lessons learned and initiation of appropriate changes.  
The systems engineering approach used at NSWC PHD could be utilized across other 
engineering agents, as well as industry, to provide a more robust and holistic system and 
platform level review that would be more beneficial to the program offices.  
The quality and overall value of NSWC PHD contributions to the customer are 
primarily reflected in the degree to which the safety, effectiveness, and affordability of in-
service weapon systems, combat systems, ship classes, and carrier/expeditionary strike 
groups/forces are improved over time by products and services delivered to the Fleet.  The 
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data and analysis generated in a SEAR provides valuable insight into the system and 
platform for the program office.  It would also be valuable to the other engineering agents, in 
particular, the Design Agent and the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).  The metrics, 
analysis, and recommendations help maintain a viable system throughout its lifecycle.  It 
also provides critical feedback into the design and acquisition process, which could help 
reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC).  To achieve the optimal return on investment for 
process and product quality improvements, SEARs need to be documented in sufficient 
detail at the appropriate frequency.  The SEAR process is the underlying closed loop 
systems engineering process that is the backbone of NSWC PHD’s methods for achieving 
the highest quality blend of products and services.   
The SEAR addresses the safety metrics of a system with regards to risks, hazards, 
and incidents.  The effectiveness is reviewed from the perspective of the Probability of 
Capability (Pc), Operational Availability (Ao), and the People Factor (Pp).  The affordability 
section relates the safe and effective metrics to the cost as a subset of TOC.  Cost drivers 
and cost savings/avoidances are discussed.  Interoperability and System Integration are 
reviewed with regards to the safety and effectiveness of the interfaces and relationships 
inside and outside the lifelines of the system.  Lastly, metrics on how well NSWC PHD is 
performing are reviewed in the areas of Fleet Responsiveness, Product Timeliness, and 
Integrated Logistics Assessment.  
Current State Approach and Challenges 
The SEAR Process—The Foundation of In-Service Engineering 
NSWC PHD performs a multitude of in-service engineering roles encompassing all 
levels of concern from the equipment level through combat systems, ship class by warfare 
area, and finally, carrier/expeditionary strike groups/forces.  The SEAR process is the 
disciplined systems engineering method applied at each level to ensure that a consistent 
approach is used to collect, analyze, and display data and information.  The goal is to 
provide the recurring assessments, analysis, and identification of issues and 
recommendations to the larger acquisition community and technical community.  For 
example, the SEAR process ensures that only authoritative data sources are employed and 
that only authoritative requirements are used, against which to measure the various SEAR 
process metrics.  The process also “cross pollinates” practices across organization 
boundaries, resulting in best-of-breed practices to be adopted by the organization at large. 
In order for NSWC PHD to effectively accomplish its in-service engineering tasking, 
the systems engineering process must also accommodate aggregating data and information 
for use at the next higher level.  That is, a closed loop systems engineering process must 
“roll up” data from a combat system to a warfare area, or from individual platforms of a ship 
class to the carrier/expeditionary strike group level.  The process must also accommodate 
“drill down,” that is, the ability to reach underlying information that supports conclusions 
made at a higher level.  Only by adhering to this process can NSWC PHD develop and 
maintain the integrated “big picture” needed to support today’s Fleet. 
By conducting the robust systems engineering analysis, critical design 
considerations are addressed throughout the acquisition lifecycle, which will have major 
impacts on TOC and will help deliver a combat system with affordable operational 
effectiveness.  Acquisition decisions and design tradeoffs are made with capabilities and 
functions that affect system performance against specifications and requirements, often at 
the expense of technical effectiveness and system effectiveness.  Fully understanding these 
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design considerations that affect the reliability, maintainability, supportability, producibility, 
operations, maintenance, and logistics is essential to improving the availability and 
efficiencies of the system.  This will lead to reaching optimal technical and system 
effectiveness.  When analyzed in the context of how these affect lifecycle cost and TOC, the 
resultant will be a more affordable and operationally effect system (see Figure 1).   The 
SEAR process provides the necessary systems engineering rigor from an In-Service 
perspective to be able to provide positive impact on the acquisition lifecycle and design of 
combat systems. 
 
Figure 1. Important Design Consideration for Affordable Operation Effectiveness 
The general guidance in conducting the SEARs is to analyze the system 
effectiveness based on the design/performance requirements or specifications, key 
performance parameters, key system attributes, and current mission requirements.  The Pc, 
Pp, and Ao parameters should be determined individually by baseline and by block type, 
depending on the system.  Because of the complexity in the higher level platform SEARs, 
the analysis, perspective, and approaches may be different.  Issues at the lower level may 
be lost or not visible when aggregated, due to redundancies or differences in higher level 
requirements.  The review must contain the impacts of commercial items and non-
developmental items.  The analysis must also take into consideration the key logistic 
elements that impact the areas being reviewed.  The cornerstone of the SEAR is to review 
these on an annual basis with the engineering rigor in the analysis to identify trends, and 
then to be proactive in providing feedback to the technical and acquisition community in a 
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closed loop process (see Figure 2).  The output of the SEAR process provides NSWC PHD 
the ability to make informed recommendations and decisions required by Fleet and program 
office customers.  It is also an opportunity to feedback to industry to affect change and 
improvements in the products and services they provide the government. 
Develop PMS
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Figure 2. Closed Loop Engineering Process 
Brief Overview of SEAR Process Elements 
Safety 
Safety, as defined by the NSWC PHD SEAR Guide, is the freedom from those 
conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment 
or property, or damage to the environment.  System Safety Programs are usually 
established in accordance with MIL-STD-882E. In the context of the SEAR process, it 
represents the level to which risks of injury or damage (hazards) to personnel and 
equipment have been mitigated, as shown in Figure 3.  The safety element is used to 
validate the continued safety of fielded systems and follows these steps: 
 Review the process and results of incorporating safety into the design. 
 Identify those processes that ensure safety during operation and 
maintenance of the equipment or system in the fleet. 
 Conduct a Safety Stand-Down prior to each Safety, Effectiveness, and 
Affordability review. 
 Develop a Risk Matrix chart categorizing each safety issue.  The sample 
chart (Figure 4) shows the number of issues by category and the acceptance 
authority action required. 
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Figure 3. Safety Process 
Mishap Risk Index Risk Level Acceptance Authority
1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B High Unacceptable (Must be resolved) / PEO 
1D, 2C, 3A, 3B Serious Undesirable / PEO
1E, 2D, 2E, 3C, 3D, 3E, 4A, 
4B Medium Acceptable With Review / AEGIS Safety Manager








D. Remote 3 4 2 2
E. Improbable 16 3
Hazard Sev rity Category
Acc t l  w Safety Manager Review
 
Figure 4. Sample Safety Risk Matrix 
NSWC PHD, as the Combat System In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA), needs to 
maintain awareness of all safety issues, document them thoroughly, and address them in a 
timely and effective manner.  These actions result in safer weapons systems and reduce 
losses of life, limb, and property. The SEAR Safety process supports PHD’s ability to make 
informed assessments of Fleet issues and to share information with all stakeholders.  It 
helps promote best practices across organizational boundaries and maintain awareness of 
all safety issues impacting a system or a system of systems (SoS) by informing the fleet of 
all safety hazards and initiating and implementing appropriate corrective actions. 
Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is defined as a function of the Probability of Capability (Pc), Operational 
Availability (Ao), and Probability of Personnel (PP; also known as the people factor).  Each 
aspect of Effectiveness is analyzed in several of the primary warfare mission areas.  
Addressing more of the primary mission areas for a more holistic understanding of the 
Effectiveness is an opportunity to improve the process.  An example of the mission areas 
covered in a typical Platform SEAR is highlighted in Figure 5. 
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• The Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier Mission is to operate 
offensively in a high density, multi-threat environment 
as an integral member of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 
or Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF)
• Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)*
• Anti-Surface Ship Warfare (ASU)*
• Command, Control and 
Communications*
• Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
• Command & Control Warfare (C2W)
• Information Warfare (IW)
Primary Mission Areas
* Covered in the SEAR
• Intelligence (INT)
• Mine Warfare (MIW)
• Mobility (MOB)
• Missions of State (MOS)
• Naval Special Warfare (NSW)
• Strike Warfare (STW)
 
Figure 5. Mission Areas Covered in a Typical Platform SEAR 
Capability: Pc 
Probability of Capability is defined as the inherent ability of weapon system, combat 
system, ship class, or carrier/expeditionary strike group/force to perform a mission.  The 
impacts of equipment and computer program reliability failures or human errors are not 
included.  In the context of the SEAR process, this definition recognizes that capability can 
only be determined within the framework of specific threats and specific environments. 
The process steps are as follows:  
 Understand what the expectations are for the system under analysis, as 
defined in the performance requirements. 
 Identify the current mission requirements and the environment in which the 
system operates. 
 Address computer program and interface limitations with other systems. 
Results from the SEAR Pc assessment are used to identify areas of improvement, or 
to highlight the lack of testing resources to fully assess a mission area capability.  The SEAR 
Pc assessment results are also used to develop and implement operational guidance that 
makes maximum use of the inherent performance capability, while minimizing the negative 
impact of system “weaknesses.”  Negative impact is minimized by the ISEA developing firing 
guidance, implementation of equipment or system upgrades, process improvements, and 
improvement of technical documentation. 
Operational Availability: Ao 
Operational availability is defined as the likelihood that when required, a system is 
operating at a pre-defined performance level and for a sufficient duration of time to 
accomplish the mission.  In the context of the SEAR process, Ao is examined as both a 
lagging and leading indicator. The following items are performed to calculate a system and 
platform Ao: 
 Ao is calculated at the System/Equipment levels.  
 The measured values should be compared to values contained in 
design/performance requirements or specifications (i.e., Weapons 
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Spec/Ordnance Spec) for newer systems and to past history for all systems 
(when available).  
 For the purposes of SEAR, Ao is calculated using critical and major failures 
only. 
 At the platform level, the first step is to define the reliability block diagram for 
the detect, control, and engage systems within the combat system.  An 
example is illustrated in Figure 6.  
 Given the mission of the platform and the types of threats expected to be 
encountered, an availability analysis is conducted given hard and soft kill 
alternatives along with conclusions and recommendations. 
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Figure 6. Example of Air Defense (AD) Ao Model Reliability Block Diagram 
Process 
While NSWC Corona is the responsible agent for calculating Ao values, it is the ISEA 
that interprets this data and determines the causes of availability trends. The communication 
and relationship between NSWC Corona and PHD are critical for successful SEAR 
implementation.  The ISEA develops solutions and/or provides recommendations to address 
availability problem drivers.  Results of the SEAR Ao assessment process can lead to the 
development of system or equipment upgrades that increase reliability, increase 
maintainability, or implement logistics changes that improve supportability.   
People Factor: PP 
Probability of Personnel, or people factor, encompasses the human systems 
integration factors in mission performance.  It examines the human performing all the 
necessary steps on time to properly maintain, set up, and operate one or more systems and 
complete the mission.  In the context of the SEAR process, the people factor can be a 
quantitative assessment (ship manning levels) and/or a qualitative assessment (correct 
NECs and proper training).  PP is comprised of five factors that, while often not directly 
measurable, can be tracked for trend-finding purposes. 
The process steps are as follows:  
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 Assess Ergonomics: Personnel safety and “usability” of operation and 
maintenance procedures are components of the Ergonomics element. 
 Assess Crew Experience 
 Assess Staffing/Manning Level 
 Assess Personnel Availability 
 Assess Training 
Analysis of PP data can result in findings within Personnel Training that result in a 
direct tie to other areas such as Availability or related trends (proper system maintenance or 
operation, personnel qualifications, manning levels, INSURV results).  The types of metrics 












Figure 7. Example Personnel Metrics 
Fill: When there is a Sailor in a billet
Fit:  When the Sailor is the right rating and has the correct skill
¾ Manning:  FIT IAW draft NWSCP Phase II instruction manning is judged RED when it is below 
70%, YELLOW from 70-85%, and GREEN at or above 85% for C5I mission area critical billets, 
calculated using the command report in FLTMPS.  
 CVN 73  
 FIT:  81.9% (262/320).
 13 of 52 Critical billets 
 FILL:  97.8% (533/543).
 CVN 72 
 FIT:  77.1% (212/275).
 19 of 49 Critical billets 
 FILL:  97.9% (522/533).
= No Known Risks/Criteria Fully Satisfied by Applicable Certification Milestone                 = Criteria Not Satisfied by Applicable 






Figure 8. Example of PP Analysis on Manning Status 
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The following are examples of how the SEAR PP assessment results add value to 
the conduct of Combat System Ship Qualification Trials (CSSQTs), Test and Evaluation, 
and Fleet training events: 
1. The shipboard training process can be modified based on pre commissioning 
unit (PCU) training results obtained from the Aegis Training Readiness 
Center (ATRC). Shipboard training would then be tailored to the needs of that 
particular crew.  Results from at-sea test events can help identify 
weaknesses not only in team training, but also in an individual sailor training 
pipeline. This can be provided to the training community for continuous 
process improvements. 
2. As the data from multiple exercises becomes available, the opportunity to 
make objective judgments on the results of these exercises will better reflect 
the operational capabilities of people and systems. Personnel manning and 
formal training levels are areas outside the direct control of the ISEA.  
However, consistent shortfalls in these areas can be documented and 
addressed, via the SEAR PP process, to the detailing, training, and Program 
Office communities to influence these personnel issues. 
3. Consistently weak areas should be analyzed from a system standpoint.  
System requirements that overburden or are confusing to an operator should 
be addressed from a hardware or software standpoint, as required. 
Recommended changes can then be documented and/or implemented to 
maintain and improve a systems maintenance and operational readiness. 
4. Deficiencies that cannot be attributed to system capabilities can also be 
analyzed. Those that have consistency across platforms should be reviewed 
in relation to the training process and changes made. Opportunities for these 
changes are available in the review of formal training courses by ISEA 
personnel, ISEA inputs to tactical and IETM documentation development 
process, and the modification of on-site training to ensure weak areas are 
addressed.  
For those areas that are random vice symptomatic (one-time deals), additional 
training can be provided as the opportunities in CSSQT or Combat System Certification 
evolutions present themselves. The results of these additional training efforts can then be 
documented, and changes implemented as necessary in technical manuals and in 
documents providing operational guidance, such as Tactical Memorandums (TACMEMOs). 
Affordability 
Affordability is the relationship of the SEAR process elements to cost.  In the context 
of the SEAR process, the goal of examining affordability is to apply TOC methodology in 
identifying cost drivers and tracking cost trends that NSWC PHD can affect. 
The process steps are as follows: 
 Examine data utilized by the Fleet and Program Managers to assess 
affordability. 
 Examine personnel requirements. 
 Report Cost Savings/Avoidance Initiatives. 
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Analysis of Affordability data allows for identification of trends in systems costs to the 
Fleet and variances in costs across various ship classes, baselines, and system variants.  
Examples are shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
 



















Figure 10. Example of Cost Savings Initiatives Reported in a SEAR 
The ISEA adds value by assisting Program Sponsors and the Fleet in achieving their 
cost reduction goals, such as the following improvement package that was submitted for 
“Top Cost” AN/SPY-1 parts:  
1. High Voltage Power Supply (HVPS) Inverter Module: Ship change document 
(SCD) 4603 adds fault detection to limit inverter failure; 
2. Phase Shift Driver (PSD) re-design has lower failure rate; and 
3. Electronic Switch 2-M repair authorized.  
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Interoperability is the ability of equipment, combat systems, ship classes, or 
carrier/expeditionary strike groups/forces to provide services to and accept services from 
other equipment, combat systems, ship classes, or carrier/expeditionary strike 
groups/forces, and to use those services to operate effectively together and to achieve 
assigned missions.  System integration is the progressive linking and testing of system 
components to merge their functional and technical characteristics into a comprehensive, 
interoperable system.  In the context of the SEAR process, interoperability refers to 
interfaces/relationships “outside the lifelines,” while system integration refers to 
interfaces/relationships “inside the lifelines.” 
The process steps are as follows: 
 Collaborative Assessment by NAVSEA Interoperability Certification 
Committee (ICC), augmented by Subject Matter Experts & Fleet users; 
 Reviewed results from land based tests & underway events; 
 Issues affecting interoperability analyzed, assessed and mapped to essential 
functions and corresponding mission areas;  
 Qualitative Assessment based on; 
 Quantity and severity of issues considered; 
 Fleet usage and comparisons with other combat systems; 
 Technical results expressed in terms of operational impact/risk; and 
 Operational perspective provided by active duty Navy Joint Interface Control 
Officers. 
Analysis of System/Platform Interoperability and/or System Integration data allows 
for identification of system issues across various ship classes, baselines, and system 
variants, as seen in Figure 11.  Interoperability issues resulting from a typical analysis are 
summarized with recommendations for mitigation.  Resolution of these types of issues will 
require collaboration between multiple program offices, contractors, and other government 
agencies.  
By identifying, solving, or supporting the resolution of interoperability/integration 
problems and issues, NSWC PHD adds value by bridging the gaps between stovepipe 
systems, and ensuring systems operate as intended to achieve its mission. As Combat 
System In-Service Engineering Agent for surface warfare, NSWC PHD helps the surface 









Figure 11. Example of Combat Systems Interoperability Assessment 
Critical Success Elements/Lessons Learned  
The critical success elements of the SEAR as a systems engineering tool are 
identifying the trends overtime and feeding the analysis back to the program office and to 
the OEM to influence the design.  The top issues and cost drivers are identified with 
proposed solutions and recommendations for improvement.  Capturing the impact of the 
recommendations in follow on SEARs requires coordination and feedback from the program 
office, as well as more detailed technical discussions with the OEM.  When all of this is tied 
together, the discussion on effectiveness and affordability become powerful drivers for 
improvements with in-service systems, as well as future designs.  Four specific examples 
resulting from the systems engineering involved in SEAR include the following:  
 The identification of transmitters as a reliability driver for a system 
significantly reduced TOC and workload. 
 The SEAR analysis for another system led to the justification of specific 
tasking shortfalls being identified and funded. 
 The identification of Surface Warfare (SUW) suitability issues led to a 
collaborative SUW white paper provided to the PEO. 
 The focus on interoperability led to follow on white papers and concepts 
being promoted across PEOs and NAVSEA with some already being funded. 
These examples show that the lessons learned from the SEAR process are folded 
back into the acquisition and technical communities.  The results of SEAR help address 
many of senior leadership’s goals, such as achieving acquisition excellence, reducing TOC, 
improving quality, building the future force, maintaining our warfighting readiness, getting the 
requirements right, and making every dollar count. 
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Identified Transmitters as a Reliability Driver for a System 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT) were 
consistently the most significant drivers for low Ao.  Deeper analysis at the subsystem levels 
showed that the transmitter was also one of the most costly items.  Thus, it was frequently 
not on board when they failed, resulting in long logistics delays, in addition to the low MTBF.   
The reliability data, together with the influence of the Fleet’s Troubled Systems 
Program, were used to justify the upgrade to a new transmitter with solid state technology, 
as well as to upgrade the entire system to a more open architecture.  The Solid State 
Transmitter ORDALT was projected to reduce the cost of ownership by 60% with a savings 
of $83,000/ship/year.  With concurrent implementation of this ORDALT, the annual Planned 
Maintenance System (PMS) workload is projected to be reduced by 68% to 78% depending 
on ship class.  The corresponding annual maintenance cost will be reduced by 59% and 
77% for these ship classes, respectively.  The failure rate of the solid state transmitter was 
reduced by 94%, thus dramatically increasing the reliability. 
The SEAR Analysis for Another System Led to the Justification of Specific Tasking 
Shortfalls Being Identified and Funded 
During the late nineties, allowed onboard spares for one system were reduced by 
50%, which greatly increased Mean Logistics Delays. In addition, the ISEA budget was 
reduced from approximately $4 million per annum to less than $1 million per annum. By 
working with the Program Manager and the Fleet, NSWC PHD drafted a stop-work message 
for the PM to disseminate.  In the meantime, the Fleet was able to convince OPNAV to 
restore the budget to previous year’s level, given the alternative of no future ISEA support. 
Identified SUW Deficiencies During Pc Assessment 
During the Pc assessment of a recent SEAR, the analysis identified concerns with 
ships’ forces not adhering to technical guidance provided to ensure that circuit card 
assemblies (CCAs) are configured to maintain Combat System Computer Program 
Certification status.   
As indicated in Figure 12, all of the ships surveyed do not meet the configuration 
requirements that are needed in order to maintain Combat Systems Computer Program 
certification status.  Most of these ships are in a de-certified status until CCAs are configured 
in accordance with technical guidance.  This finding is influencing the design of future 
combat systems by reducing the number of configurable items.  New technical 
documentation is being developed to help with troubleshooting efforts from a system of 
systems perspective.  Current technical documentation does not provide detailed guidance 
to troubleshoot complex system issues.  This is leading to improving the training curriculum 
to re-reinforce the importance of maintaining configuration control, adherence to technical 
guidance and system level troubleshooting techniques. 
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Figure 12. SEAR Pc Assessment—Configuration Management of Circuit Card 
Assemblies (CCAs) 
As part of the SEAR process, a combat system is currently assessed in two primary 
warfare areas: Air Defense and Surface Warfare.  The SEAR SUW Pc assessment provided 
an insight into areas that required more attention in order to improve our effectiveness, Pc.  
Recent at-sea testing results provided details into how our combat system elements are 
integrated in a system of systems architecture.  The at-sea integration of the various 
systems, computer programs, and shipboard personnel provides the perfect venue for 
identifying and better assessing the capabilities and limitations of a combat system in 
support of all mission areas.  The SEAR assessment provided visibility into some of the 
challenges that the technical community need to address in the following areas:  
 Improve situational awareness.  These include sensor improvements as well 
as better information distribution throughout the ship. 
 Improve system effectiveness through improved sensor capability (e.g., 
detection range, accuracy, data rate exchange). 
 Improve operator proficiency through training and other means.   
 Improve weapons effectiveness primarily by the introduction of a new weapon 
or SUW mission for an existing weapon.   
Identified Interoperability Issues and Recommendations 
The focus on interoperability led to follow on white papers and concepts being 
promoted across PEOs and NAVSEA.  Highlights of this effort include the following: 
 Need for testing early in the acquisition process and with appropriate 
resources during at-sea test events.  
 Interoperability requirements need to be addressed at the element level, 
combat system and continue to the system of systems level.    
 Need for conduct of a robust interoperability testing early during system 
integration and evaluation phases.  At-sea interoperability test events are 
conducted in a single ship environment. Interoperability issues are not found 
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until a new baseline goes into a multi-ship environment, sometimes after 
deployment.   
 Need to improve technical documentation for the operators, provide feedback 
to the training community, and improve communication among agencies.   
 Need for creation of a set of standards (Interoperability metrics) and practices 
on testing, training, and evaluation to take the ambiguity out of the results.  
Also, establishing a community infrastructure for interoperability can help 
resolve a great deal of the conflicts that are present today. 
 Increase the emphasis on interoperability during Combat System Computer 
Program certification. Historically, for emerging Aegis baselines, 
interoperability has not played a role in Combat System Computer Program 
Certification.  There is a need to place more emphasis on interoperability 
testing and issues resolution. 
Future State Goals (Technical and Programmatic) 
The future state is envisioned to have all elements, equipments, and systems of the 
entire combat system analyzed individually, as well as being rolled up into a higher platform 
level review.  The rigor of a systems engineering approach used in the SEAR process 
should be adopted across ISEAs.  A consistent formalized process will enable the technical 
community to provide rapid and direct feedback into the acquisition lifecycle.   The goal 
would be to use the analysis and inputs from the In-Service community in the acquisition 
and design decisions of the program office, other engineering agents, and the OEM.  This 
would allow the government–industry team to affect changes on current systems and define 
better requirements for designing future systems.  
Issues identified through the SEAR process can support program office investments 
to improve their system readiness.  The value of this process has not been widely 
advertised outside of NSWC PHD.  Once mature, the SEAR process can provide metrics 
that may indicate areas that ships should investigate prior to major inspections, exercises, 
and deployments.  Program managers may benefit from metrics that highlight high cost 
drivers, maintenance/manning/training issues, diminishing manufacturing sources, 
reliability/maintainability/availability concerns, and open safety issues. 
Another goal is to introduce a Mission-based SEAR that would show the impacts of 
systems performance in particular mission areas, given the various readiness decisions 
affecting funding levels and capability upgrades.  A phased approach would be utilized, 
starting with AD and SUW mission areas on a single ship, followed by the addition of 
Undersea Warfare and Strike.  All mission areas on multiple ships would lead in to the 
mission focus based on Operational and Tactical Situations.  This would require more 
extensive data from Materiel Readiness Database, a new Casualty Reporting database, and 
the Operational and Tactical Situations block diagram to support analysis. 
Increasing Scope to Include Other Warfare Centers/SYSCOMs Who Support ISEA 
Work and Fleet Sustainment 
The assessments used to produce the data for a SEAR are being conducted at 
different levels including equipment and system.  The challenge is to take the individual 
equipments, elements, and systems into a holistic platform level SEAR.  This is partly due to 
the differences in analysis methodology used by different ISEAs.  The difficulty comes from 
analyzing and understanding the complexities of stacking or additive effects when rolling up 
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the data.  The main thrust of these reviews is to look at the trends and issues vice the 
individual metrics. 
Even though NSWC PHD is the ISEA for many of the combat systems, other ISEAs 
need to provide inputs for their systems in order to assess effectiveness of a platform or 
strike group.  For example, C4I systems need to be assessed for impacts to interoperability 
within a platform, as well as with other platforms within a strike group.  Electronic Warfare 
systems need to be assessed as part of the detect control, and engage missions within a 
platform.   Once the SEAR process is stabilized and tools are available to facilitate data 
collection, discussions will be initiated with other ISEAs regarding the SEAR process and 
their possible participation in the assessments.  This would allow a better understanding of 
the element and system level, as well as a more comprehensive look at the system of 
systems and platform level.  This would be extremely useful across multiple program offices 
and industry partners.  
Use of a Database Collaboration Tool   
There are many authoritative databases which address similar issues from different 
perspectives.  A collaboration tool would compare data from various sources to validate 
ground truth or to investigate specific issues further.   
Data collection and sorting has been and still is the most time consuming and 
laborious part of the SEAR process.  Analysis is the critical element of SEAR, which 
oftentimes is cut short depending on the amount of data collected and sorted.  The data 
collaboration tool would have the data available in the correct format, so that the analysis 
can be conducted when required—not after the time it takes to collect data. 
Information Assurance Assessment 
Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command Computer Tasking Order 06-02 (DTG 
062305Z MAR 06) requires all afloat platforms to conduct monthly Information Assurance 
Vulnerability (IAV) scans.  IA needs to be part of the SEAR process and will be added to the 
list of SEAR metrics. 
The ISEA needs to ensure our systems have the capabilities to Protect, Detect, and 
React to internal and external attacks through the application of security services such as 
the following: Availability, Integrity, Authentication, Confidentiality, and Non-Repudiation. We 
need the assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes, or 
devices, support cross domain solutions, multiple levels of protection for voice/data traffic 
and provide cryptographic solutions interoperability between allied/coalition partners and the 
United States.  In addition, attacks are expected to occur, and the detection tools and 
procedures that will allow the capability to react to and recover, reconstruct, and examine 
the sequence of events and/or changes in an event need to be in place.  
Predictive and Proactive ISE Support 
Currently, the ISEA plans to ensure systems are available when needed.  As an 
example, high failure rate critical parts are spared onboard ships to minimize down times.  
The spares loadout and approved parts list are developed using various sparing models.  
This does not prevent failures from occurring—it just minimizes down time.  The next step 
would be for the ISEA to predict when a potential failure of a critical part on a ship will occur 
and recommend that replacing the part will prevent a system casualty while underway.  By 
knowing when critical parts are replaced, together with the part’s MTBF, we can develop the 
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ship’s mission profile and determine if the part has a high probability of failing during a 
particular mission.  A collaboration tool would be required to sort the large amounts of data 
required to predict potential failures that may impact a ship’s mission.  As with most of the 
information from the SEAR, this is critical to share with the program office and industry, so 
that contracts can be put in place and the appropriate infrastructure can be established, 
allowing the Navy to buy the right parts at the right time with minimal delay time.  
Redesign the SEAR Process so That It Incorporates Elements of the Capabilities 
Based Assessment  Methodology in Order to Provide Relevant Recommendations to 
Our Program Managers 
Definition: The Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) is the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System analysis process. It answers several key questions for 
the validation authority prior to their approval: define the mission; identify capabilities 
required; determine the attributes/standards of the capabilities; identify gaps; assess 
operational risk associated with the gaps; prioritize the gaps; identify and assess potential 
non-materiel solutions; and provide recommendations for addressing the gaps (CJCS, 
2009). 
The SEAR focus needs to address “what it takes to win” for a warfare area, major 
combat operation, or a specific mission thread, and not transformation for transformation’s 
sake.  The SEAR recommendations need to identify the optimal mix of assets (Sensors, 
Weapons, C2, Networks, Platforms, Warriors) and the functional, performance, and 
integration requirements and candidate solutions to support warfighter operational 
requirements.  The SEAR recommendations need to support acquisition decision-making by 
providing traceability back to warfighter requirements.  It must also assess the impact of 
programmatic trades, system failures, and engineering decisions on warfighter capability, 
including management of materiel and non-materiel solutions. 
By using the CBA methodology, the SEAR will provide the program manager with 
recommendations with clear impacts to a warfare area requirement, major combat operation 
requirement, or specific mission thread requirement.  The SEAR recommendation should 
identify interoperability and other technical risk areas in a systems architecture and the 
impact of potential issues on the operational mission. 
Warfare Center Future Way Ahead Recommendations 
The way ahead for the SEAR should be to adopt more robust systems engineering 
processes across engineering agents to better assess the systems they support not only at 
the equipment or system level but at a more comprehensive platform level.  The SEAR 
process is the backbone and foundation of the systems engineering process at NSWC PHD.  
The leadership at PEO IWS has embraced this systems engineering approach and 
recognizes the usefulness and value that it adds.  Plans are in process to expand this 
process across the ISEAs to allow for all elements and systems to be rolled up into the 
platform level SEARs, which would provide more insight into the whole integrated combat 
system.  This approach will allow the warfare centers to fully data mine and integrate the 
information that is already collected.  Ultimately, this would enable a comprehensive and 
fully integrated view of Fleet performance.  It would provide the necessary information to the 
PEO to understand the state of the Fleet, to identify affordability and TOC initiatives, as well 
as to support the Navy’s budgetary process by raising critical Fleet issues.  Industry can also 
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use this information to better understand the requirements, improve their current products, 
and incorporate them into future system designs more effectively and efficiently. 
The objective of the way forward in applying this systems engineering process is to 
provide detailed feedback from the Fleet and In-Service community to the program office 
and industrial base, which provides insight and helps drive well-informed decisions.  It 
should provide valuable inputs to the future performance requirements and design 
assumptions, such as manning levels, crew training, logistics, and maintenance issues.  
This process must maximize the use of existing authoritative data from across the 
community. 
This paper supports the recommendations that the SEAR process, as a fundamental 
systems engineering tool, should be utilized by ISEAs for systems under their cognizance.  
As the Combat Systems ISEA, NSWC PHD will then be able to roll up the individual 
equipment, elements, and systems into a more inclusive platform level assessment.  The 
products of the SEAR should be provided to the PEOs to allow them to make more informed 
acquisition decisions that will impact the future design and upgrades.  The information must 
also be shared among the other Engineering Agents and the OEM, so that the information 
from the in-service perspective can affect change early in the design process and 
acquisition lifecycle. 
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